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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
STATES-DEVICE FOR "AVOIDANCE" OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEBT LIMITATION
Provision in the Wisconsin Constitution that "The state shall
never contract any public debt..."'. led the Wisconsin Legislature
to authorize a complex plan for financing an extension to an exist-
ing state office building. Following statutory authority,2 the
State Building Commission (hereafter called "the commission")
proposed to lease the existing building, and the land upon which it
stood, to the Wisconsin State Public Building Corporation (here-
after called "the corporation"), a dummy corporation.3 The con-
sideration was one dollar, and the lease was made on condition
that the corporation construct a desired extension to the office
building. The lease was for fifty years, and expressly authorized
the corporation to borrow money from the State Investment Board
to finance construction of the extension by mortgaging the lease-
hold interest in the existing building and lands. By an agreement
between the State Investment Board and a private insurance com-
pany, the latter was to take over the loan. The corporation was
to re-lease the entire property back to the commission, for a term
of thirty-four years, at a rate equal to the semi-annual payment
of principal and interest on the corporation's mortgage. The com-
mission in turn was to rent space in the building to the various
state agencies-the rent being paid from general tax revenues.
Upon default of the corporation's obligation the mortgagee-insur-
ance company was given power to foreclose upon the leasehold in-
terest and dispose of it at public auction. In a declaratory judg-
ment action to determine the validity of this statutory plan, held:
the statutes, insofar as they authorized mortgaging an interest
in the existing building and lands, were unconstitutional and void.
In so doing, the court repudiated a case precedent of twenty-five
years standing, upholding a similar plan.
Debt limitations in one form or another appear in many state
constitutions. Such limitations were largely an outgrowth of reck-
less financing and imprudent lending of state credit, to finance
canals, railroads, and other internal improvements in the middle
I Wis. Const. Art. VIII, § 4.
2Wis. Stat. §§ 13.351, 14.86, and 14.88 (1953).
3 The court decided that the corporation was ". . . not an agency or in-
strumentality of the state, but a private corporation organized for a public
purpose... The fact that its purposes are of such a public character or
that it has been incorporated by state officers, are insufficient to cause
it to be a state instrumentality or agency." State ex rel Thomson v.
G-essel, 267 Wis. 331, 65 N.W.2d 529, 534 (1954).
4 State ex rel Thomson v. Giessel, 267 Wis. 331, 65 N.W.2d 529 (1954).
CASENOTES
1800's, and were designed mainly to protect future generations
from burdensome taxes, and to preserve state credit.5 It is evi-
dent, however, that if the word "debt" were given its broadest
signification, many essential functions of state government would
be impossible.6 Recognizing these considerations, the generally
accepted view is that "debt," as referred to in state constitutional
debt limitation provisions, results only when a liability which
could be met out of future taxation has been incurred.7 Such
interpretation has lead to judicial acceptance of the "special fund"
doctrine, whereby an obligation to provide payment solely from
a special fund resulting from the revenues of a given project does
not constitute a debt.8
In form, the financing arrangement in the instant case created
no present liability, as the only apparent obligation of the state
was to make future rent payments. Moreover, those rent pay-
ments were to be taken only from "revenues" derived from opera-
tion of the building. But the obligation to pay rent from the
"special fund" was accompanied by a mortgage whereby the state
might lose the use of its office building for a period of up to thirty-
four years should the special fund "revenues" be insufficient to
meet maturing rent. The court had no difficulty in determing
the practical effect of the plan. Rather than risk loss of the use
of its existing office building, the court felt the state would be
effectively coerced to make its rent paymentsY Since revenue
from operation of the building was to be derived solely from rent
for office space, charged to the various state agencies, it is ap-
parent that the ultimate burden would have been borne by the
taxpayers of the state. Hence, the Wisconsin court concluded
that the substance of the proposed plan of financing fell within
the constitutional debt limitation.
In reaching its conclusion, the court pointed out that the legis-
5 Williams and Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements as Affected by Con-
stitutional Debt Limitations, 37 Col. L. Rev. 177 n.1 (1937) describes
the historical development of limitations upon state indebtedness.
6 See Swanson v. City of Ottumwa, 113 Iowa 161, 91 N.W. 1048 (1902);
15 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations 338 (3d ed. 1950).
7 Williams and Nehemkis, supra note 5, at 187.
8 Kirby v. Omaha Bridge Commission, 127 Neb. 382, 255 N.W. 776
(1934); State College Development Ass'n v. Nissen, 66 S.D. 287, 281 N.W.
907 (1938); Note, Constitutional Public Debt Limitations, 29 Neb. L.
Rev. 75 (1950); 23 Iowa L. Rev. 653 (1938). See Williams and Nehemkis,
supra note 5, at 211 for an indication of the states which have accepted
the special fund doctrine as applied to states and state agencies.
9 See Williams and Nehemkis, supra note 5, at 198; 23 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 360 (1950).
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lature would have had power to authorize the state to enter long-
term leases for office space to house state agencies. And if the
lessor of such premises leased to the state would mortgage them
to finance construction of improvements required under the lease,
the arrangement would have been proper.'0 This dictum is con-
sistent with the generally accepted view that a long-term lease
of property does not result in "debt,"-the rationale being that
the common-law landlord-tenant relationship does not result in
present liability for future rent." But if a court is to examine
the real substance of a plan, it is difficult to see how the plan
spoken of with approval by the court would differ much in sub-
stance from the one it struck down. As a practical matter, the
compulsion upon the state to pay its rent, or be compelled to
move lock, stock, and barrel from a building which is the heart
of its governmental activity, would be almost as great, even though
the state stood to lose the use of no property to which it held legal
title. Be that as it may, however, there seems little basis for
disagreement with the holding of the case that the plan, as pro-
posed, would have resulted in an obligation of a sort sought to be
prevented by the constitutional limitation.
Nebraska has a constitutional debt limitation very similar
to that of Wisconsin.'2 As a result, construction of university and
normal school dormitories has been financed by three party ar-
rangements, including a dummy corporation, similar to the Wis-
consin plan.13 At present, statutory authority exists for the is-
suance of further state school housing bonds.14 Statutory authori-
zation for turnpike authority financing was enacted in 1951 by
the Nebraska Legislature, 15 but the authority was abolished by
the 1955 Legislature.' Presently outstanding dormitory bonds
are payable solely from the "net rentals" derived from operation
of the dormitories.' 7 Statutory authority for financing proposed
1o State ex rel Thomson v. Giessel, 267 Wis. 331, 65 N.W.2d 529 (1954).
11 State ex rel Thomson v. Giessel, 267 Wis. 331, 65 N.W.2d 529 (19'54);
Bowers, Limitations on Municipal Indebtedness, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 37, 51
(1951).
12 Neb. Const. Art. VIII, § 1.
13 The dummy corporations are incorporated pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat.
§§ 211501 to 21-1504 (Reissue 1954), and construction of the dormi-
tories was authorized by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 85-401 and 85-402 (Reissue
1950).
'4 L.B. 138, passed at the 1955 Session of the Nebraska Legislature.
15Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-1201 through 39-1239 (Supp. 1953).
16L.B. 271 repealed Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-1201 through 39-1239 (Supp.
1953).
'7Neb. Rev. Stat. § 85-402 (Reissue 1950).

